Voting Technology
Clarification of Decertification/Recertification Orders from Secretary of State Kevin Shelley
Below is the clarification of the 23 security measures California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley is requiring California counties to meet in order to have their paperless, touchscreen voting systems recertified (not including the AccuVote-TSx system, which cannot be recertified prior to the November election.)
Clarification of Conditions for Using Electronic Voting Machines at the November 2004 Statewide General Election
Many county elections officials have requested clarification of the 23 conditions for using DREs at the November election. Based on numerous conversations with elections officials, vendors and other interested parties, we are providing the following information.
1. Provide Option of Voting on Paper at Polling Places Should there be an unexpected failure of a voting system or any of its components, we want to ensure that voters are not disenfranchised. Therefore, paper ballots must be available at all polling places as a backup. A voter must have the option of voting on paper if he or she wishes. Provisional ballots may be used for this purpose. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any cost of making paper ballots available is not borne by counties.
2. Creating a Permanent Record of Each Ballot Cast We believe that creating a permanent record of each ballot cast is useful for purposes of subsequent auditing of the system even though the record created lacks the benefits of a voter verified paper audit trail. Therefore, as we directed at theMarch election, at least four original CD-Rs, DVD-Rs or DVD+Rs (but not CD-RWs, DVD-RWs or DVD+RWs) containing images of the voted ballots cast on each touch screen (DRE) voting machine used in the election must be created. Two of the disks should immediately be sent to the Secretary of State. Two of the disks should be retained by the county elections official. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any cost of creating the disks is not borne by counties.
3. Parallel Monitoring Following the procedures implemented at the March election, we will conduct parallel monitoring of voting systems at the November election. The monitoring will not involve taking any units out of service on Election Day. We will work with you to ensure that the monitoring does not interfere with the conduct of the election. Any costs will be borne by the Secretary of State’s Office.
4. Provide a Technical Security Plan We want to ensure that all reasonable steps are being taken to secure the voting system from tampering. Therefore, a Technical Security Plan must be submitted to the Secretary of State by September 17, 2004. The Plan should be consistent with the recommendations contained in the RABA Report (Trusted Agent Report to the Maryland Department of Legislative Services by RABA Innovative Solution Cell (RiSC) dated January 20, 2004 (http://www.raba.com/press.html?id=9)), to the extent applicable, to the voting system being used. At a minimum, the Plan must, to the extent applicable to the voting system being used, provide for creating security key cards with computer-generated passwords by precinct. By obtaining the plans, we anticipate being a resource for the counties by serving as a clearinghouse for “best practices” in this regard. However, in order to avoid compromising security, the details of the plans will be kept confidential by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any additional cost of preparing the Technical Security Plan is not borne by counties.
5. Federal Testing and Qualification Federal testing and qualification are essential to help ensure that all components of a voting system function accurately, reliably and securely. To the extent that federal testing and qualification apply, we believe that all components of a voting system must pass federal testing and qualification procedures. We are working with the vendors with respect to federal testing and qualification. This should not involve any county costs.
6. State Testing and Certification Full state testing and certification is essential with respect to all components of a voting system to help ensure that the voting system functions accurately, reliably and securely. Therefore, these are requirements with respect to all components, including peripheral components such as precinct control modules or similar devices. We are working with vendors with respect to state testing and certification. This should not involve any county costs.
7. Late Modifications We are concerned that in the past we were often presented with requests for approval of proposed last-minute changes in software, firmware or hardware. These requests often were made so close to the election that adequate federal or state testing could not be performed. Therefore, to allow time for adequate testing, proposed changes in software, firmware or hardware, with respect to the November election, must, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be submitted by September 17, 2004. This should not involve any county costs.
8. No Official Results Received by Component Modem Our security experts advise us that receiving official results through a public telephone system increases risks of tampering with electronic voting systems. Therefore, official results must not be received through a public telephone. This should not involve any county costs.
9. No Wireless Connection Our security experts advise us that wireless telephone connections to voting system components increase risks of tampering with electronic voting systems. Therefore, wireless connections cannot be part of any voting system. This should not involve any county costs.
10. No Internet Connection Modem Our security experts advise us that Internet connections increase risks of tampering with electronic voting systems. Therefore, Internet connections with any part of a voting system are not permitted, directly or indirectly, at any time. This should not involve any county costs.
11. Physical Security Plan We want to ensure that all reasonable steps are being taken to secure the voting system from tampering. Therefore, a Physical Security Plan must be submitted to the Secretary of State by August 4, 2004. The Plan should be consistent with the recommendations contained in the RABA Report (Trusted Agent Report to the Maryland Department of Legislative Services by RABA Innovative Solution Cell (RiSC) dated January 20, 2004 (http://www.raba.com/press.html?id=9)), to the extent applicable. At a minimum, the Plan must, to the extent applicable to the voting system being used, provide for applying tamper resistant tape to terminals to prevent non-authorized entry of security key cards into the terminals and instituting strict procedures to prevent the use of unauthorized supervisor cards. By obtaining the plans, we anticipate being a resource for the counties by serving as a clearinghouse for “best practices” in this regard. However, in order to avoid compromising security, the details of the plans will be kept confidential by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any additional cost of preparing the Physical Security Plan is not borne by counties.
12. Compliance with Security Enhancements We want to ensure that all reasonable steps are being taken to secure the voting system from tampering and to ensure its accuracy, reliability, security and accessibility. Therefore, counties will be subject to poll monitoring such as that conducted at the March Statewide Primary Election and there must be compliance with all of the procedures set forth in the approved procedures for the particular voting system being used. In addition, as provided for in Elections Code section 15001, a copy of each election computer vote count program must be provided to the Secretary of State for escrow no later than 5 p.m. on the seventh day before the election.
13. Poll Worker Training The success of the election depends, in large part, on poll worker training. Therefore, a Poll Worker Training Plan must be sent to the Secretary of State by September 17, 2004. By obtaining the plans, we anticipate being a resource for the counties by serving as a clearinghouse for “best practices” in this regard. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any additional cost of preparing the Poll Worker Training Plan is not borne by counties.
14. Communication Plan One of the problems that was identified in some counties at the March election was difficulty in communicating between the polling places and the central elections offices. Therefore, a Communication Plan must be sent to the Secretary of State by September 17, 2004. By obtaining the plans, we anticipate being a resource for the counties by serving as a clearinghouse for “best practices” in this regard. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any additional cost of preparing the Communication Plan is not borne by counties.
15. Provisional Ballots on Paper There were problems at the March election with respect to processing electronic provisional ballots under Elections Code section 14310(c)(3)(A). Therefore, provisional ballots, except at early voting sites, must be on paper. The Secretary of State’s Office is committed to ensuring that any additional cost of making provisional paper ballots available is not borne by counties.
16. Disability Access Devices At the March election, we received complaints from some individuals with disabilities that some disability access devices attached to DREs did not work properly resulting in possible disenfranchisement. We believe that it is appropriate to identify any problems with the disability access devices before the polls open so that the problems can be fixed before voting begins. Therefore, the devices must be tested before the polls open. This should not involve any county costs.
17. Posting of Results We believe that the Elections Code requires that after the polls have closed, results should be posted at the polling place for each electronic voting machine if the machine is capable of printing out results. The results should be posted for 48 hours but elections officials are not required to monitor the polling place after the polls have closed to ensure that the posting remains for the entire period. It is sufficient to advise the facility owner or manager that the posting should remain for 48 hours. This should not involve any county costs.
18. Tampering Penalties In order to deter any tampering of electronic voting machines and consistent with the RABA Report (Trusted Agent Report to the Maryland Department of Legislative Services by RABA Innovative Solution Cell (RiSC) dated January 20, 2004 (http://www.raba.com/press.html?id=9), the penalties for tampering with voting devices should be posted. We will provide signs that can be used for this posting. This should not involve any county costs.
Vendor Conditions:
Several conditions involve vendors rather than county elections officials. For example, vendors must provide to the Secretary of State source codes and functioning systems as well as specific documentation regarding voting systems. These conditions are being discussed directly with vendors.
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This page was first published on July 14, 2004 |
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December 6, 2011
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