Voting Technology
Decertification/Recertification Orders from Secretary of State Kevin Shelley
Below are the 23 security measures California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley is requiring California counties to meet in order to have their paperless, touchscreen voting systems recertified (not including the AccuVote-TSx system, which cannot be recertified prior to the November election.) These 23 measures are excerpted from Secretary Shelley's April 30, 2004 decertification orders.
Security Measures for Paperless Touchscreen Voting Systems
1) Permit every voter to have the option at his or her polling place of casting a ballot on a paper ballot which may be satisfied by providing an adequate number of paper ballots to each polling place based on each County’s assessment of the number of persons who may request them. The cost of additional paper ballots specified in this paragraph shall be borne by the vendor of the voting system that sought its certification or approval for use in California, or the vendor’s successor in interest;
2) At the time the ballot is cast or during the period allowed for conducting the official canvass, a paper version or representation of each ballot cast on each unit of the voting system shall be printed out on paper. The paper version shall not be provided to the voter but shall be retained by elections officials for use during the one percent manual recount or other recount or contest. The cost of printing a paper version or representation of each ballot cast on each unit and the storage of such printouts specified in this paragraph shall be borne by the vendor of the voting system that sought its certification or approval for use in California, or the vendor‘s successor in interest;
3) The voting system shall be subject to “parallel monitoring” as directed by the Secretary of State;
4) At least 46 days prior to any election in which the voting system is proposed to be used, the elections official conducting the election shall submit a Technical Security Plan that is consistent with the directives of the Secretary of State and the recommendations contained in the Trusted Agent Report to the Maryland Department of Legislative Services by RABA Innovative Solution Cell (RiSC) dated January 20, 2004 (RABA Report) (http://www.raba.com/press.html?id=9) to the extent that the recommendations are applicable to the voting system proposed for use;
5) Federal Testing and Qualification. The voting system, and all of its hardware, software, and firmware, including all of its peripheral equipment, has been fully tested by and qualified for use by the appropriate federal entities, if applicable;
6) State Testing and Certification. The voting system, and all of its hardware, software, and firmware, including all of its peripheral equipment, has been approved for use in California elections by the Secretary of State of the State of California following full testing;
7) The Source Code for any software and firmware used as part of any of the voting system, including commercial off the shelf software that is available to and disclosable by the vendor, shall, upon demand of the Secretary of State, at any time before or after approval is requested, be provided to the designee or designees of the Secretary of State for analysis, subject to any reasonable time and confidentiality restrictions, as determined by the Secretary of State;
8) The full record of all documents submitted or resulting from the federal qualification process shall, upon demand of the Secretary of State, at any time before or after approval is requested, be provided to the designee or designees of the Secretary of State for analysis, subject to any reasonable time and confidentiality restrictions, as determined by the Secretary of State;
9) Complete documentation of each hardware, software and firmware version for any component of the voting system, including detailed change logs, for any part of the voting system, shall, upon demand of the Secretary of State, at any time before or after approval is requested, be provided to the designee or designees of the Secretary of State for analysis, subject to any reasonable time and confidentiality restrictions, as determined in the sole discretion of the Secretary of State;
10) Complete documentation regarding the development environment and development process for any software or firmware used in any component of the voting system, including but not limited to configuration files, translators, libraries, and options sufficient to allow exact reconstruction of the object code used in any component of the voting system, shall, upon demand of the Secretary of State, at any time before or after approval is requested, be provided to the designee or designees of the Secretary of State for analysis, subject to any reasonable time and confidentiality restrictions, as determined by the Secretary of State;
11) Functional Systems Provided to Secretary of State. Upon demand of the Secretary of State, at any time before or after approval is requested, the vendor seeking approval or whose voting system has been approved, shall provide to the Secretary of State, a working version of the components, including all hardware, software and firmware, of the voting system that is proposed to be used at an election, for purposes of analysis and testing, staff reference and public education. The components shall be maintained in working order by the vendor;
12) Limits on Requests for Late Modifications. A request for a change or modification of the voting system that might impair the accuracy and efficiency of the voting system shall not be submitted to the Secretary of State, unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of State, within 46 days prior to any election in which the voting system is proposed to be used.
13) Telephone Connections. No component of the voting system shall be permitted to receive official elections results through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system;
14) No Wireless Connection Hardware. No component of the voting system shall include the hardware necessary to permit wireless communications or wireless data transfers to be transmitted or received;
15) No Internet Connections. No component of the voting system shall be physically connected at any time, directly or indirectly, to the Internet;
16) Physical Security Plans. At least 90 days prior to any election in which the voting system is proposed to be used, the elections official conducting the election shall submit to the Secretary of State, a Physical Security Plan regarding all of the components of the voting system, including the details of how a chain of custody with respect to all of the components is monitored and documented;
17) Compliance with Directives. The elections officials conducting an election using the voting system, and the vendor of the voting system that has sought its certification or approval for use in California, or the vendor’s successor in interest, shall abide by any directive issued by the Secretary of State of California, in writing, that is designed to safeguard or enhance the security of the voting system and its use, including, but not limited to, directives related to random audits, poll monitoring, parallel monitoring, security plans, election observer plans, Logic and Accuracy Tests, the providing of tabulation software for escrow with the Secretary of State, and physical security plans. Any such directive will be issued within a reasonable timeframe before the election to allow for full compliance;
18) Training. The elections official conducting the election shall, at least 46 days prior to the election in which the voting system is proposed to be used, submit to the Secretary of State the Poll Worker Training Plan for the election in every jurisdiction using that system, including a copy of the materials to be provided to the poll workers. The training must provide adequate, hands-on training for each poll worker for the voting system being used, including instruction on the use of each component part and the steps to follow if any component of the voting system fails or appears to fail to function properly;
19) Communication Plan. The elections official conducting the election shall, at least 46 days prior to the election in which the voting system is proposed to be used, submit to the Secretary of State a Communications Plan detailing how elections officials and polls workers at each polling place will communicate on Election Day.
20) Provisional Ballots. Provisional voters must cast ballots on paper ballots;
21) Disability Access Devices. Disability Access Devices, intended to benefit voters who desire to use such devices, shall be connected to voting machines prior to the time the polls open;
22) Posting of Results. A copy of the results from each voting unit that is capable of printing out a tabulation of the results shall be posted for public inspection for at least 48 hours outside each polling place; and
23) Tampering Penalties Posted. There shall be posted at polling places, in all applicable languages, a notice regarding the penalties for tampering with any component of the voting system.
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This page was first published on July 14, 2004 |
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